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Abstract:  In this paper, I will argue that there are important differences between a criticism and an objection; that 
is to say, we should make a distinction between them. In the paper, I will do the following. First, I will review some 
pertinent literature. Second, I will give my reasons for thinking there is a distinction. Here I will be relying on 
insights from J. L. Austin and L. Wittgenstein. Third, I will make the distinction between an objection and a 
criticism by providing a definition of each term with appropriate supporting considerations. Finally, I will give my 
reasons for believing that the distinction is an important one by showing its utility in argumentation theory. 
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1. Introduction  
 
One way in which the arguer can satisfy the demands of objectivity is by taking into account and 
responding to dialectical material, such as objections, criticisms, counterarguments, alternative 
positions etc. In this paper, I will argue that there are important differences between a criticism 
and an objection; that is to say, we should make a distinction between them. In the paper, I will 
do the following. First, I will give my reasons for thinking there is a distinction. Here I will be 
relying on insights from J. L. Austin. Second, I will review some of the pertinent literature. 
Third, I will make the distinction between an objection and a criticism by providing a definition 
of each term with appropriate supporting considerations. Finally, I will give my reasons for 
believing that the distinction is an important one by showing its utility in argumentation theory. 
 
2. Grounds for thinking there is a distinction 
 
2.0. Overview 
 
In this section, I present my argument for making a distinction between an objection and a 
criticism. First, I appeal to what I call ‘The Austin Principle’ which I extract from A Plea for 
Excuses. Second, I canvass some relevant authorities about meaning and usage: Webster 
(online), American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, and Roget’s Thesaurus, all of 
which, I believe, support the view that these two terms have distinct meanings and should not be 
conflated, or used as if they were synonymous. 
  
2.1. Austin on distinction 
 
As justification for my claim that ‘objection’ and ‘criticism’ should not be conflated, I refer to J. 
L. Austin (1957) in A Plea for Excuses. There Austin writes:  “First, words are our tools and, as a 
minimum, we should use clean tools: we should know what we mean and what we do not, and 
we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us… Thirdly, our common stock 
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of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and connections they 
have found worth making, in the lifetime of many generations” (Austin, 1957, pp.7-8). From the 
above text, what I extract might be dubbed ‘The Austin Principle’: 
 
That there are two different terms (which we might think mean the same thing, or 
are equivalent) is a prima facie reason for thinking that there is an important 
difference in meaning, particularly when lexical definitions diverge. 
 
To say that a reason is a prima facie reason is to say that that reason can be rejected or 
overturned by sufficiently strong reasons. Austin himself went to some trouble to distinguish 
between ‘entails,’ ‘implies,’ and ‘presupposes’ in How to Do Things with Words (1975). I hold 
that the terms ‘criticism’ and ‘objection’ do not mean the same thing. From which it follows that 
the distinction between them is worth marking and attending to. Appropriate linguistic 
authorities support Austin’s view, as I shall show in the next section. 
 
2.2. Support from dictionaries and Roget’s Thesaurus 
 
The view I am defending is supported by what we find in dictionaries and Roget’s Thesaurus. 
 
 A: The American Heritage Dictionary (2012) entries read as follows: 
 
Objection: act of objecting; a statement or other expression offered or presented 
in opposition; an adverse contention, ground or reason or cause for expressing 
opposition or disagreement 
 
Criticism: the act of making judgements or criticizing; 2. a passing of unfavorable              
judgment; censure’ disapproval; 3. the art skill or profession of making skilled              
judgements and evaluations (literary)      
         
The verbal differences between these definitions are apparent. 
 
            B: The Miriam Webster Online Dictionary (2015) entries: 
 
Objection: a reason for disagreeing with or opposing something; act of objecting  
Examples: He said he had no objection to the plan. My main objection is that 
some people will have to pay more than others. 
 
Criticism: the act of expressing disapproval and of noting the problems of faults 
of a person or thing: the act of criticizing someone or something; a remark or 
comment that expresses disapproval; the activity of making careful judgements 
about the good and bad qualities of books movies, etc. 
 
While there is obvious verbal difference, it is not clear that the difference is substantial, though 
the reference to both making careful judgements about the good and bad qualities in the 
definition of ‘criticism’ does seem to differentiate it from ‘objection.’ It would seem that  
‘criticism’ is a more complex undertaking.  
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C: Roget’s Thesaurus (2001) entry for ‘objection’ 
 
Objection: 520 protest; 728.4 obstacle; 1004.2 demurrer; 773.3 have no    
                 objection 
 
These terms all suggest some form of opposition. Note that the term ‘criticism’ does not appear 
in this list. I take this as some evidence that Roget’s Thesaurus provides some support for my 
view that the two terms are distinct in meaning. 
 Here is the Roget’s (2001) entry for ‘criticism’: 
 
 Criticism: 493.2 judgement; 604.2 commentary; 967.4 censure  
 
First, the terms above suggest more than just opposition; they suggest some sort of supported 
opposition. Second, the term ‘objection’ does not appear; which indicates that the authors 
considered that there is no overlap in the entries. 
 Thus I believed that the Roget’s Thesaurus (2001) points in the direction of the position I 
am taking—viz., that these terms have different meanings, and the lexicographical evidence cited 
here provides support for my position. I now proceed to look at some pertinent secondary 
literature. 
 
3.  Review of some pertinent literature 
 
In this section, I discuss the positions taken by two scholars who have paid particular attention to 
this matter, Trudy Govier (1999) and Douglas Walton (2011).  
 
3.1.  Govier’s position (1999) 
  
In Chapter Thirteen of The Philosophy of Argument (1999), “Progress and Regress…”, Govier 
offered one of the first attempts that I am aware of to think through the question of just what an 
objection is, and to develop in a somewhat systematic way a doctrine of types of objection.  
 Govier (1999) begins by presenting an intuition: “an objection is an allegation that there is 
something wrong with the position of the arguer.” (I must say that here our intuitions do not line up. 
My intuition is that an objection is more like a challenge than an allegation of wrongdoing. But 
more of this later.) Govier (1999) then discusses the focus of the objection and offers this account: 
 
an objection is (a) any claim alleging a defect in the argument or its conclusion; (b) 
which, insofar as it does not compete for the same intellectual and social space as 
that conclusion, does not constitute an alternative position to the conclusion; and is 
either (c) raised by the audience to which the argument is addressed or (d) might 
plausibly be raised by that audience; or (e) might plausibly be raised by a rational 
person to whom the argument might plausibly be addressed. (p. 229) 
 
This account is important for a number of reasons. First, to the best of my knowledge this is the first 
definition of an objection to be found in the scholarly literature by argumentation theorists about 
argument. (I find that startling. One would have thought that it would have emerged as a concept 
worth clarifying.) Second, here Govier distinguishes between an objection and an alternative 
position. I support this distinction and will want to incorporate it into my own theory. Third, 
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Govier’s account contains the clear recognition that an objection proceeds out of Otherness; it is a 
concern raised by someone in the audience, or one’s interlocutor. It is a type of argumentative 
material that should be distinguished from an alternative position. Indeed, I want to take the next 
step and propose that we might also usefully distinguish between an objection and a criticism.  
Fourth, Govier sees an objection as a form of resistance to the argument—a claim alleging a defect 
in the argument or its conclusion. Here I think Govier’s position is too limiting and will explain why 
shortly.  Govier now offers a more succinct characterization of an objection: 
 
 An objection is an argument, a consideration put forward, alleged to show either that 
there is something wrong with the conclusion in question or that there is something 
wrong with the argument put forward in its favour. (p. 229) 
 
This account contains an important “amendment” not found in the earlier account; for here Govier 
seems to require that an objection be an argument, in the sense that some reasoning must itself 
support the objection. I say “seems” because she uses both “argument” and “consideration” here, 
and the latter might seem to allow for a simple claim to qualify as an objection. But that issue seems 
to be settled by what she then says: 
 
Implicitly, if not explicitly, one who raises an objection is either saying “O; therefore 
there is something wrong with conclusion C” or “O; therefore there is something 
wrong with the argument in support of C.” Here “O” refers to the substantive 
considerations which constitute the premises of the objection.” (Govier, 1999, p. 
229) 
 
I take this to mean that Govier thinks of an objection as itself having the form of an argument and as 
leading to the conclusion that there is something wrong with the argument. I will argue that this 
view is too narrow. 
  
3.2. Douglas Walton (2011) 
 
In his paper for OSSA 10, Walton writes: 
 
We begin by noting that the term ‘objection’ is quite a broad one. An objection 
does not necessarily have to be a counter-argument posed against an original 
argument. It could be merely asking of a critical question. Even when an objection 
is a counter-argument posed against an original argument, it does not have to be 
an argument that the original  argument is weak, unsupported or incorrect. It could 
be a procedural objection,1 not implying that the argument it is addressed against 
is incorrect, insufficiently supported by evidence, or even questionable as an 
argument in itself. Such a procedural objection could merely claim that the 
argument, even though it might be reasonable enough, or well enough supported 
in itself, is not appropriate for use in the context of the given discussion. In law, 
for example, an argument might be objected to on the grounds that the evidence it 
purports to bring forward has been obtained illegally, even though that evidence 
                                                     
1 This suggests a subdivision  (procedural v. substantive), but Walton (2011) does not focus on developing it. 
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might otherwise be quite convincing in itself as a rational argument. (Walton, 
2011, p.2) 
 
Walton seems here concerned with the relationship between an objection and a counterargument. 
I believe he is on the right track in wanting to distinguish them. He also takes the view that an 
objection is an argument, a position that I will argue against.  
 On the whole, I agree with what Walton has said; my one reservation is that he has not 
provided a clear definition of ‘objection’—something I intend to do later. 
 
3.3. Krabbe (2007) 
 
In this paper Krabbe lists seven ways an opponent can critically react to a proponent’s expressed 
argument. (1) A request for clarification, explanation or elucidation may contain an implicit 
criticism that the argument was not clearly expressed to start with. (2) A challenge to an 
argument comprises an expression of critical doubt about whether a reason supports the 
argument. (3) A bound challenge raises a more specific doubtful point that offers some reason 
for entertaining doubt. (4) An exposure of a flaw poses a negative evaluation of an argument and 
requests further amplification. (5) Rejection is a kind of critical reaction by an opponent who 
may not deny that the proponent’s argument is reasonable, but takes up an opposite point of 
view. (6) A charge of fallacy criticizes the contribution of the proponent by claiming he or she 
has violated some rule of fair procedure. (7) A personal attack is a common kind of critical 
reaction that provides a means of defence against unreasonable moves by one’s opponent (2007, 
pp. 55-57). Krabbe (2007) suggests that all these critical reactions can properly be called 
objections, because they expresses dissatisfaction with an argument presented by a proponent (p. 
57). If, as it appears to me, Krabbe conflates ‘objection’ and ‘critical reaction,’ that seems to me 
mistaken. For an objection may be intended just as a test: How would you react to X? Krabbe 
also seems to take the view to speak of a request for clarification or a pure challenge as an 
objection would be an overstatement, because objections, he believes, presuppose a negative 
evaluation, whereas these other two types of reaction precede evaluation. It seems to me that 
Krabbe’s view is too narrow; an objection may simply be a challenge to the argument.2  
 
3.4. Summary 
               
In this section I have reviewed the positions of three important theorists: Walton, Govier, and 
Krabbe. In each case, I have found the account wanting. I believe that there is room for 
improvement. I proceed next to draw the distinction between an objection and a criticism. 
 
4. Making the distinction between objection and criticism 
 
4.1. The nature of an objection: A proposal 
            
The previous sections surveyed various positions on the nature of an objection and indicated 
some problems. In this section, I argue that we need a broader account of what an objection is, 
one that will pave the way for the distinction between an objection and a criticism.  An important 
                                                     
2 Krabbe and van Laar (2011) in Ways of Criticism offer the following categories: objections, critical questions (but 
not criticism), rebuttals, refutations, counterarguments, and fallacy charges.   
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consequence is that the arguer’s dialectical obligations are different with respect to these two 
types of dialectical material. 
 
            A definition of ‘objection’ 
 
Typically, an objection as posed by the objector, will go something like this: “I want to raise the 
following objection:...” However, there are other ways of signaling this sort of intervention. 
Thus:  
 “But how then do you distinguish between X and Y?” can be rephrased as an objection = 
your position does now allow for a distinction between x and y.   
 “What do you say to those who argue that p?” can be rephrased as an objection = my 
objection here is that p. 
  “But doesn’t your argument assume that p”? can be rephrased as an objection: my 
objection here is that p. 
 All of these ways of phrasing an objection make it clear that an objection is a response to 
a specific argument. The response makes plain that there is dissent, disagreement, difference, 
without however providing support for that claim.  
Let me, then, propose the following definition3: An objection is “(1) a response to an 
argument that (2) expresses propositional content that (3) presents a challenge, difficulty or some 
possible impediment to the goal of being rationally persuaded by the argument.”4 I now 
comment on each of element of the proposed definition. 
 (1) An objection is one type of response to an argument. An objection only exists in a 
dialectical environment.5 No statement or assertion is an objection per se. It only takes on that 
status when it is directed toward a specific argument. (That is not to deny that objections can 
exist in advance of an argument: viz., the standard objections.) 
 (2) An objection has propositional content that is typically presented in a statement or an 
assertion, but need not be. A question can be used to present an objection: “But how do you 
handle this situation?” This is not an assertion yet it may express an objection. Thus the 
reference to propositional content avoids restricting objections to responses that take the form of 
statements. It allows for a question to count: How do you respond to the objection that p?  
(3) The propositional content in some way challenges the argument—whether by raising 
a question, or posing a potential problem. However, it need not assert the existence of a flaw or a 
problem, because the one raising the objection may only be testing of the argument. The objector 
may wish to see how the arguer can respond to the objection.  On the other hand, it is also often 
the case that the one who raises the objection thinks that the objection has the potential for 
undermining the argument. The future life of an objection could be as a criticism, as I understand 
that term. For if the objector is not satisfied with the arguer’s response to the objection posed, he 
or she may decide to re-present the arguer with that same content, now in the form of a criticism.  
 An objection may be directed to an explicit part of the argument—a premise or an 
inference or even the conclusion: “I object to your premise to the effect that…..”  But it need not 
be. It seems quite common that the objection is directed against something that the objector 
believes is assumed or implied by the argument. 
                                                     
3 If asked what kind of definition, I would say that it is a theoretical one. See Johnson and Hamby (2015). 
4 My position here is to some degree dependent on the frame of argument as rational persuasion. 
5 See Johnson (2000). 
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 There are two immediate payoffs to this way of defining an ‘objection.’ First, we bring 
our definition into somewhat closer alignment with informed use. That is, we do not rule out as 
an objection a statement not supported by any reason. Other accounts by Govier (1990) seem to 
have this consequence. Second, this definition paves the way for drawing the distinction between 
an objection and a criticism, a matter I turn to next. 
 
4.2. Distinguishing between ‘objection’ and ‘criticism’  
 
The first point to attend to is that the term ‘criticism’ is generally taken to have a negative 
connotation. We hear it said: “Don’t be so critical” or “You’re so critical all the time.” And when 
we say such things, we are in using “critical” in the sense of making an adverse judgement. (The 
same cannot be said of ‘objection’.) 
 However, criticism, as I propose to explain it, is not necessarily adverse or negative, 
though, as we shall see, there is a good reason why criticism (in the sense discussed here) tends 
to be negative. In intellectual work, and particularly in argumentation, we acknowledge the value 
of criticism, and we teach our students that it is important to develop "the critical spirit" (Siegel, 
1988). In university we teach subjects like literary criticism. In these cases, "criticism" is closer 
to its original meaning. The word “criticism” derives from the Greek word krinein from which 
we get our words "critic" and "critical"—which means to estimate the value of something. A 
critic is a person who judges, appreciates, estimates the value of something. A good critic can see 
both the strengths and the weaknesses in whatever is being discussed, say a work of art or a 
musical performance. A good critic of an argument can see both the strengths and  weaknesses in 
the argument and makes his or her assessment in light of them 
 The value and importance of criticism is indicated in this remark by the psychologist, Dr. 
Arnold Rincover: 
 
There is one thing that everyone wants to give and no one wants to receive. 
Criticism. You can call it "correction," "feedback," "guidance," or any nicer 
sounding name, but most people still hate it. It is a rare person who likes 
criticisms ... Yet it is crucial. After all, how can we know if we're doing a good 
job if our strengths and weaknesses aren't evaluated and told to us?6  
 
Notice the tension between the idea of criticism as something that no one wants (here thinking of 
it as negative), and criticism as helping us see our strengths and weaknesses (which some do 
want). Rincover's next comment is quite remarkable: “The truly wise and strong will actively 
solicit criticism. They want it, chase it, and are excited ... because it is an opportunity to learn.” 
This remark certainly applies in the practice of argumentation, at least as I conceive it. Once the 
arguer has produced an argument for the purpose of rational persuasion (reaching the most 
rational position), the arguer will want feedback. If the purpose of the exercise were simply to 
cow the other into submission or to make the arguer feel good about himself, then only 
“positive” criticism and praise would be welcomed. But I have been supposing that participants 
come to the practice of argumentation with a different orientation, one in which the arguer is 
open to, and indeed interested in, seeing the problems with the argument. The orientation of the 
arguer, as I have been conceiving of it, is something along these lines: “Here are the reasons that 
                                                     
6 Unfortunately, I cannot give a specific reference for this text. 
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I think this claim is true.7 I hope you find them persuasive. If you do not, if you find my 
reasoning defective, I would be enlightened to know why, so that I may revise my own views if 
necessary.” The arguer as we have imagined her is, thus, essentially interested in receiving 
criticism; and if no criticism should arise, the arguer will solicit it. 
I have been discussing what might be called “the spirit of criticism.”  Let me return our 
focus to the thing itself. The term ‘criticism,’ is ambiguous as between a single claim or 
allegation of a defect in the argument, and an extended set of criticisms, which we might term a 
critique. This latter, I see as an attempt to offer an overall assessment of the argument, one which 
assesses both strengths and weaknesses and comes to an overall judgement of its merits based on 
this assessment.8 The latter is more developed dialectically than the former which in turn is more 
dialectically developed than an objection. In what follows, I shall be looking at the former sense, 
that of a single criticism (on a par with a single objection).  
 Having discussed the nature of criticism, I proceed to propose a definition. 
  
4.3. A definition of “criticism”  
  
The definition of ‘criticism’ I will propose parallels the definition given above for ‘objection.’ 
The basic idea is that a criticism is a developed and focused dialectical intervention, as 
contrasted with an objection which need not take the form of an argument and which is often not 
clearly targeted. A criticism, then, is a claim supported by reasons that the argument suffers from 
some defect.  
Specifically, a criticism of an argument is (1) the expression of propositional content that 
(2) claims that the argument suffers from a defect (or defects) and (3) provides appropriate 
support for the claim.9 The critic makes an assertion or claim, (C), which identifies some 
propositional content, (P) of the argument (A) as defective, and supports (C) with a line of reasoning 
(R).  Criticism, as I understand it here, must take the form of an argument, whereas that is not the 
case with an objection.    
I now offer comments on each of these three components. 
          (1) Like an objection, a criticism has propositional content. Just booing and giving the 
raspberries, though these might qualify as criticism in common parlance, would not qualify as 
criticism. The propositional content of a criticism is categorical. It is more than suggestion or 
challenge or probe. It asserts a specific defect in the argument. Thus, criticism will be susceptible 
of truth-falsity. 
         (2) Criticism, as conceived herein, requires a specific assertion about a specific defect in 
the argument. Criticism focuses on some particular aspect of the argument--whether it be a 
premise, an inference, an assumption, an implication, the conclusion—and alleges a defect in 
that part of the argument. If one adopts a traditional approach to argument analysis, then the 
criticism will be directed either to one of the premises, or to the inference from the premises to 
the conclusion. But no matter what theory of evaluation one adopts, these features must be 
present. 
           (3) Criticism is reasoned. The critic cannot simply assert the existence of the defect in 
question. Why not? The short answer is that the critic is bound by the same constraints of 
                                                     
7 This would include both illative core and dialectical tier. 
8 See Logical Self-Defense (1983), 2e. 
9 How is a criticism different from counterargument? alternative position? These are interesting questions which I 
cannot undertake to answer here. 
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rationality as the arguer. It would neither be rationally satisfying, nor would it appear to be so, 
were the critic to merely assert that the argument suffered from a defect (say, begged the 
question) without providing the reasons or evidence to support this claim (which will almost 
certainly be controversial). In line with the rationality requirements of the practice of 
argumentation, then, it follows that the criticism must be reasoned.  
   For example, Searle’s “Re-iterating the Differences” (1977) contains many criticisms of 
Jacques Derrida’s position as set out in Signature, Event, Context (1989). Searle criticizes 
Derrida’s interpretation of J. L. Austin’s theory of speech acts, arguing that “Derrida’s version of 
Austin is unrecognizable.” That is the criticism. Now comes support. First, Searle claims, 
Derrida completely mistakes “the status... .” Second, Derrida mistakenly assumes that in using 
the term parasitic Austin meant to suggest, etc.”  Here I make no attempt an evaluation of the 
criticism. I present it simply as one example of criticism, in the sense in which I have defined 
that term. 
 
4.4. Distinguishing between objection and criticism  
 
As discussed above, the prevailing practice seems to be to use the terms objection and criticism 
more or less interchangeably—to make no distinction between them. I believe that it is beneficial 
to make a distinction. The reason is not the fondness philosophers have for making 
distinctions—a fondness satirized by William James in a famous passage from What Pragmatism 
Means (1907/2014)10—but rather because I believe that a case can be made for the proposition 
that the arguer’s dialectical obligations depend on the type of dialectical material being dealt 
with. My sense is that the arguer has a greater obligation to respond to a criticism than to an 
objection, for two reasons. First, because a criticism is more dialectically developed, it will tend 
to have greater potential to destabilize the argument; it poses a greater challenge. And the author 
of the criticism has put forward an argument, not a mere comment. Hence, it would seem that the 
arguer’s obligation to respond to criticism is stronger than the obligation to respond to an 
objection. 
  Someone may object that the distinction as I have presented it here does not fully capture 
the practice. I agree, but I believe that is because the practice is all over the place, so to speak. If 
I am right, then no attempt to report the use of the term “objection” would be able to capture all 
of the practice, because that practice is not itself uniform and/or consistent.  
Someone else may object to the drawing of such a fine distinction as trifling. In response, 
I can point out that it is not at all unusual in our theorizing to make a distinction not drawn in 
either ordinary language or technical language. For example, Perelman (1958) distinguishes, 
where others have not, between the rational and the reasonable, and between persuading and 
convincing. O’Keefe (1987) drew a distinction between what he called Argument-1 and 
Argument-2 that many have found useful. Whether such “fine” distinctions are worthwhile 
depends on their ability to help us in the matters under investigation.  
I turn finally to the utility of the distinction I have offered. 
 
 5. The utility of the distinction 
 
First, I submit that this proposal does what a distinction is supposed to do: it provides clarity, a 
clear demarcation between an objection and a criticism, based on the degree of dialectical 
                                                     
10 The passage is about a debate regarding a squirrel, whether it goes around the tree or not. 
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development. Second, it can be used to provide a rational basis for prioritizing dialectical 
material in the following way. If the arguer were to adopt the position argued for here, then he or 
she will deal with any criticisms first, because they are clearer in that they are more dialectically 
developed than objections, and second, because in the view presented here they are arguments 
and so have a somewhat stronger claim on the arguer’s attention.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have argued that there are important differences between a criticism and an 
objection; we should make a distinction between them. After a review of some pertinent 
literature, I gave my reasons for thinking there is a distinction. I then made the distinction 
between an objection and a criticism by providing a definition of each term with appropriate 
supporting considerations. Finally, I gave reasons for believing that the distinction is an 
important one by pointing to its utility in argumentation theory. 
 
References 
 
American Heritage Dictionary  (5th ed.). (2012). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Austin, J. L. (1975). How to Do Things with Words (2nd ed.). J. O., Urmson & M. Sabisa (Eds.). 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Austin, J. L. (1979). A plea for excuses. In: J. O., Urmson & G. J. Warnock (Eds.), 
 Philosophical Papers (3rd ed., pp. 175-204). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Derrida, J. (1989). Signature, event, context. In  G. Graff (Ed.), Limited Inc. (2nd ed., pp. 1-24). 
 Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Govier, T.  (1999). The Philosophy of Argument. Newport News, VA: Vale Press 
Hamblin, C. L. (1970). Fallacies. London: Methuen 
James, W. (2014). What pragmatism means. In: Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old Ways of 
Thinking. The Cambridge Library Collection [Reproduction of the original (1907) 
edition. London/New York/Bombay: Longmans Green & Co.] (pp. 43-84). 
Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Johnson, R. H. (2000). Manifest Rationality. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.  
Johnson, R. H. & Hamby, B. (2015). A meta-level approach to the problem of defining ‘critical 
thinking,’ Argumentation 29 (4), 417-430.  
Krabbe, E. C. & van Laar, J. A. (2011). The ways of criticism. Argumentation 25 (2), 199-227.  
O’Keefe, D. (1982). The concept of argument & arguing. In: J. R. Cox & C. A. Willard (Eds.), 
Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research (pp. 3-23). Carbondale, IL: Southern 
Illinois University Press. 
Miriam-Webster Dictionary. (2015). Retrieved from http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
Roget’s Thesaurus (6th ed.). (2001). B. A. Kipfer & R. L. Chapman (Eds.) New York. Harper 
Collins.  
Searle, J. R. (1977). Reiterating the differences: A reply to Derrida. Glyph 1, 198-208. 
Toulmin, S. (1958). The Uses of Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Walton, D. N. (2009). Objections, rebuttals and refutations. In: J. Ritola (Ed.), Argument 
Cultures: Proceedings of the 8th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the 
Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 3-6 June 2009, (pp. 1-10). Windsor, ON: OSSA. 
 RALPH H. JOHNSON, FRSC 
 
11 
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. (G. E. M Anscombe Trans.). Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
 
